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Abstract
This paper develops and implements a semiparametric estimator for investigating, with
panel data, the importance of human capital accumulation, non-separable preferences of
females and child care costs on females life-cycle fertility and labor supply behaviors. It
presents a model in which the agents’ expectations are correlated with their future choices
and provides a set of conditions under which statistical inferences are possible from a short
panel. Under the assumption that observed allocations are Pareto optimal, a dynamic model
of female labor supply, labor force participation and fertility decision is estimated. In that
model, experience on the job raises future wages, time spent nurturing children aﬀects
utility, while time spent oﬀ the job in the past directly aﬀects current utility(or, indirectly
through productivity in the non-market sector). This paper then uses the estimates from the
model to conduct diﬀerent policy simulations which shows that human capital accumulation
is the most important determinant of life-cycle fertility behavior.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we estimate a choice theoretic model of female labor supply and fertility behavior
with panel data, and use our estimates to predict how changes in family policy would aﬀect
the behavior of these variables over the life cycle. The motivation for investigating dynamic
interactions between fertility and female labor supply comes from broad trends in aggregate
behavior and also empirical results from previous empirical work using cross sectional and panel
data.
At the aggregate level the trends in birth rates and female labor supply and the wages of
females in developed countries are striking. Measures of annual total fertility rates (TFRs)
provide a useful way of summarizing trends in fertility at the aggregate level. There are two
basic measures, by period and/or by cohort. A period TFR predicts the total life time number
of births if a representative woman realized the age-speciﬁc fertility rates that prevailed in a
given year. A cohort TFR measures the number of children born to a particular birth cohort.
Both measures used for the U.S. and most developed countries show there has been a substantial
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example at the beginning of this century a typical woman in the U.S. who reached the age of 45
bore, on average, four children over her lifetime, but by the end of the century, that number has
fallen to only 1.9. The period TFR was 4.0 in Sweden in 1905 and had declined to 1.4 by the
mid 1980’s.2. Although the majority of women in developed countries eventually bear a child,
an increasing fraction of them bear no children. The incidence of childlessness has ﬂuctuated
over the twentieth century but seems to have increased towards the end of the century. For
example, Hotz et al (1996) report that over the last 20 years the incidence of childlessness has
almost doubled in the U.S., going from 9% of women who reached age 40-45 in 1978 to 18% for
comparably aged women in 1994. 3 The changes in total fertility rates over the last century
have been accompanied by changes in the life-cycle timing of childbearing by women who were
of fecundity age during the era. The so called baby boom of the U.S. was in essence fueled by
women shifting their childbearing to earlier ages, and the subsequent bust was largely the result
of the tendency for childbearing to be delayed.4
Parallel to this marked decline in childbearing has been a rise over time in female labor force
participation in both developed and developing countries.5 In the US the participation of all
wives increased by 36% over the last 25 years, the rates of mothers with children under the age
of three increased by 83%, and by 91% for women with children one year old or younger. The
rise in female participation in the labor force has been accompanied by a decline in the diﬀerence
between male and female earnings of full time workers.
These aggregate trends can be rationalized by simple economic models of household choices.
The parents’ demand for children depend on the prices of the inputs used in raising children,
and the levels of household income and/or wealth. The opportunity cost for the mother’s care
and nurture for her oﬀspring is the female wage rate, and as this increases female labor supply
increases and the fertility rate falls. Controlling for the wage, a simple model predicts that
families with more wealth have more children. These simple models also predict that the prices
of other goods and services, including child quality, and the mother’s market wage rate(s) can
also explain families’ demand for children. However, the sign and magnitudes of these eﬀects are
most often not unambiguously indicated by theory, which means that these issues are empirical
questions.
Empirical investigations of micro data bear out these predictions. The mother’s wage is
negatively related to the demand for children in all types of models of fertility (Ward and
Butz (1979, 1980), Hotz and Miller (1988)).6 The relationship between household wealth and
fertility, controlling for the opportunity cost of the mother’s time, is harder to document. Schultz
(1976) reports many earlier studies that found a positive relationship between family income
and/or consumption and parental fertility. Several more recent studies also found a positive
relationship between parental fertility and husband income or other household income (Ward
and Butz (1980), Wolpin (1984), Hotz and Miller (1988)). On the other hand Willis (1973) ﬁnds
1See Hotz et al (1996) and reference there in for a survey on this issue.
2See Walker (1995) for details.
3Some of this increase reﬂects the decline in the fraction of women who are married over the same period.
But the incidence of childlessness has risen among married women as well. See Hotz et al (1996) and reference
therein for more details.
4See Hotz et al (1996) for details on this shift.
5See Heckman and Killingsworth (1996).
6See Paul Schultz (1976) for a summary of some the earlier studies.
2a U-shape relationship between completed fertility and husband income, while Heckman and
Walker(1990) found that there weakis a, if any relationship between husband’s income (and also
female wages) and the incidence of childlessness.
A further complication to interpreting the evidence about the eﬀects of higher female wages
on fertility was introduced by Becker (1965), who argued that parents not only choose the
quantity of oﬀspring but also their quality. Thus highly educated parents might choose to have
a lower number of children, but invest more inputs in them. This modiﬁcation to the basic
model provides another reason why women with higher opportunity costs have lower fertility
rates. Therefore the almost unanimous ﬁnding, that parental demand for children are negatively
related to the educational level of the mothers, is hardly surprising. This result holds in static
models of completed fertility (Willis (1973))7, reduced form dynamic models (Walker (1996),
Hotz and Miller (1988), Hotz, Heckman and Walker (1990)), and structural dynamic models of
fertility and contraceptive practices (Wolpin (1984), Hotz and Miller (1993)). In a more direct
test of the role of the mother’s inputs on measures of childhood achievement, Michaels (1992)
ﬁnds that after controlling for labor supply the oﬀspring of more highly educated women perform
better at school.
While the basic models of fertility can be used to explain the relationship between total
fertility rates and measures of female labor supply and household wealth, they have much less to
say about the timing of births and how this is related to female labor supply over the life cycle.
Empirical dynamic models of fertility ﬁnd that the time costs young children impose on their
mothers help to rationalize the spacing of later births (Hotz and Miller (1988). Similarly there
is strong evidence from dynamic models of labor supply and human capital accumulation that,
in addition to providing wages, work experience is a form of investment in human capital that
increases the future wage rate (Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Miller and Sanders (1997), Altug
and Miller (1998)). Thus the costs of staying home to raise children are signiﬁcantly greater
than the current wages foregone.
These empirical results suggest that the patterns of investing in the work force through
current labor force participation is intertwined with decisions about the timing and the amount
of oﬀs p r i n gah o u s e h o l dc h o o s e st oh a v e .T h i ss t u d yt h e ni sa na t t e m p tt oc o m b i n eb o t hf o r m s
of human or family capital within a uniﬁed framework. Only by capturing both kinds of choices
can one reasonably expect to answer policy questions that bear upon how households will change
their contraceptive and labor force behaviors in response to changes in provisions for maternity
leave, child care facilities and the tax treatment of dependents, to name just three examples of
topical interest.
Recently there have been a number of paper looking at the importance of female’s fertility
behavior on their labor supply, Angrist and Evans(1998) looked at the eﬀect of children on there
mothers’ labor supply however this was done in a static reduced form model which did not
allow them to examine the issue of timing of birth, time cost,and human capital accumulation,
simultaneously on labor supply and the joint eﬀect of supply on fertility behavior. In this vein
similar to this paper, Francesconi(2002) estimated a dynamic model joint fertility and work
decision of married women. However they only have full time versus part work, did not looked
directly on the human capital accumulation mechanisms, the diﬀerent costs of having children
nor the timing and spacing of birth over the life-cycle.
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3The next two sections provide the theoretical underpinnings to our empirical investigations.
Section 2 lays out a life cycle model of labor supply and fertility. Then in Section 3 we derive the
conditions implied by dynamic optimization that form the basis for identiﬁcation and estimation.
Sections 4 through 7 are the heart of the estimation. First, we explain our estimation strategy
in Section 4. Then we brieﬂy summaraize the sample of households used in our empirical work,
which is drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In Section 6 we report our
estimates of the wage equation from wage and labor supply data. The wealth eﬀects of the
household are estimated in Section 7 from data on consumption. In Section 8 we estimate from
data on labor supply and births the parameters that determine preferences for children, as well
as the direct intertemporal eﬀects of labor supply or leisure on household utility. The last two
sections of the paper explore the quantitative implications of our model. They use the estimates
obtained from the body of the estimation to conduct some policy simulations and summarize
our ﬁndings.
2. A FRAMEWORK
The model is set in discrete time, and measures the woman’s age beyond adolescence with
periods denoted by t ∈ {0,1,...,T}. It analyzes the accumulation of two kinds of human
capital, oﬀspring and labor market experience.
Female labor market experience for the nth household in our sample is embodied in the
wage rate, denoted wnt, and depends on labor market experience and demographic variables.
The latter, denoted by znt, include such variables as age, formal education, regional location,
ethnicity and race. It is assumed that znt is independently distributed over the population with
cumulative probability distribution function F0(znt+1 | znt). Let hnt denote the proportion of
time worked in period t as a fraction of the total time available in the period, let dnt denote
participation in period t, that is an indicator if hnt > 0. We assume that the mapping from
experience to the current wage rate is given by:
wnt = g(dnt−ρ,...,dnt−1,h nt−ρ,...,hnt−1,z nt) (2.1)
for some positive integer ρ. Thus Equation 2.1 shows that, in addition to the demographic
variables, the current wage depends on past participation and past hours up to ρ periods ago.
The birth of a child at period t is denoted by the indicator variable bnt ∈ {0,1}. It contributes
directly to household utility. We assume that the spacing of births is related to preferences by
the household over the age distribution of its children, as captured by interactions in the birth
dates of successive children. More speciﬁcally, let γ0 denote the additional lifetime expected
utility a household receives for its ﬁrst child, let γ0 +γk denote the utility from having a second
child when the ﬁrst born is k years old, let γ0 + γk + γj denote the utility from having a third
child when the ﬁrst two are aged k and j years old, and so on. Thus the deterministic beneﬁts
from oﬀspring to the nth household in period t can be summarized by the random variable, U0nt,
deﬁned as:







Raising children requires market expenditure and parental time. We assume that the dis-
counted cost of expenditures of raising a child is π, a parameter that varies with household
4demographics, and that a k year old requires nurturing time of ρk. Letting cnt denote the frac-






Equation (2.3) nests several speciﬁcations of the child care costs (or the related child care
technology) considered in the literature. Hill and Staﬀord(1980) found, using data from time
diaries, that maternal time devoted to child care declines as the children age. To capture this lat-
ter pattern, suppose that the demands a child makes on its mother’s time declines geometrically
with age after a give age M,s ot h a t
ρk =
½




where 0 <δ<1. Our speciﬁcation for child care costs ignores two issues which have been
examined in the literature. First, it implies that the child care process exhibits constant returns
to scale in the number of existing children. The evidence on the importance of such scale
economies is mixed; Lazear and Michael(1980) ﬁnd evidence of large scale economies while
Espenshade(1984) ﬁnds them to be small. Second, by assuming that the coeﬃcients in equation
(2.3) are ﬁxed weights, no substitution is allowed between market and maternal time in the care
of children. However, by interpreting these cost as the minimum time required nurturing time
and allowing π to vary according to individual characteristics we can capture such eﬀects in this
model.
Leisure in period t, denoted lnt, is deﬁned as the balance of time not spent at work or
nurturing children. It follows that the time allocated between nurturing children, market work
and leisure must obey the constraint:
1=hnt + lnt + cnt (2.5)
Apart from having utility for children, household utility also comes from its consumption of
market goods, denoted xnt, and leisure, denoted lnt. We assume that preferences are additive
in consumption and leisure, but not separable with respect to leisure at diﬀerent dates. To
model this dependence, deﬁne z∗
nt =( bnt−M,...,b nt−1,h nt−ρ,...,hnt−1,z0
nt), where the ﬁrst ρ
elements of z∗
nt capture the dependence of the current household state on lagged labor supply
and birth choices, and the remaining elements are the set of observed demographics. Letting




This formulation incorporates both ﬁxed and variable utility costs associated with working. It
models the variable costs of working as a mapping of observed household characteristics alone,
but allows participation in the work force to be determined by observed factors, entering through
u2(z∗
nt,d nt).W ea s s u m et h a tu1(z∗
nt,1 − hnt − cnt) is a concave increasing function in lnt.


























Let εntk (k = {0,...,3}) demographic and psychological factors that determine the precise
timing of birth and participation in the labor force that is unobserved by the econometrican, and
that (εnt1,...,ε nt1) is identically and independently distributed across (n,t) with multivariate
probability distribution F14 (εnt1,...,εnt4).
The third component in utility is derived from current consumption. We denote by U3nt ≡
u3(xnt,z nt,ε 5nt) the current utility from consumption by household n in period t,a n da s s u m e
u2(xnt,z nt,ε 5nt) is concave increasing in xnt for all values of the observed and unobserved
demographic variables (znt,ε 5nt). Analogous to the assumptions made for the other unobserved
variables, we assume ε5nt is identically and independently distributed across (n,t) with bivariate
probability distribution F5 (ε5nt).
The period t utility for household n utility is found by summing over the three components.
Let β ∈ (0,1) denote the common subjective discount factor, and write Et(.) as the expectation
conditional on information available to household n at period t. The expected lifetime utility of










Iknt(U0ntk + U1ntk + U3nt + εntk)
#)
(2.10)
Table 1 displays the notation deﬁning the main elements of our model.
3. Optimal Decision Making
In this paper we assume there are no distortions within the labor supply and consumer goods
markets. This approach was recently utilized by Altug and Miller (1998) to estimate a life-cycle
model of how work experience aﬀects female wages and labor supply. Indeed, over the last decade
an empirical literature has emerged that tests for deviations from Pareto optimal allocations
using panel data on households. (See, for example, Altug and Miller (1990), Altonji, Hayashi
and Kotilikoﬀ (1995), Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), Miller and Sieg (1997), and Townsend
(1994)) Taken together, this body of work shows that the restrictions imposed by Pareto optimal
allocations are quite hard to reject with panel data on households, unless one assumes very
limited forms of population heterogeneity, and also that preferences are strongly additive, two
assumptions that are widely regarded by microeconomists as being implausible. In addition, the
limited empirical work that exists on incomplete markets cannot easily be generalized beyond
the highly stylized frameworks that are investigated. So while few economists believe that
the real world supports a rich set of Arrow Debreu securities spanning the commodity space,
in the absence of clear guidance about precisely how gains from trade are left unfulﬁlled, the
6assumption of ignoring such impediments to trade is a useful working hypothesis. In this case
the assumption, that observed allocations are Pareto optimal, allows us to derive optimality
tractable conditions from a model in which households deal with the complex interactions that
arise from spacing births, given the time commitment to their young, while simultaneously
determining labor supply in a world where labor force attachment impacts on future wages.
The Pareto optimal allocations are derived as the solution to a social planner’s problem
for a large population of households n in a cohort deﬁn e do nt h e[0,1] interval, in which the
integral of the weighted, expected discounted utilities of each household are maximized subject
to an aggregate feasibility or resource constraint. Therefore, the objective function for the
social planner is formed from the individual utilities deﬁned by Equation (2.10), and the social
weights attached to each individual n, which we denote by η−1
n . The planner is constrained by
the time available to each household n in the period t ∈ {1,2,...,T} that cohort is active,
which is Equation (2.5), and must respect the time required to nurture children, as indicated by
Equation (2.3). At the margin consumption goods are produced, the value of marginal product
function for labor, which is Equation (2.1), and net transfers between members of the cohort and
others (including other income generating family members and public transfers) are exogenously
set to Wt in period t. We now state the social planner’s constrained optimization problem more
formally.
The aggregate feasibility condition equates aggregate consumption at each date t to the sum
of output produced by all individuals n ∈ [0,1] and the aggregate endowment Wt. Deﬁning L
as the Lebesque measure which integrates over the cohort population, this constraint requires:
Z 1
0
(xnt + πbnt − wnthnt)dL(n) ≤ Wt (3.1)











Iknt(U0ntk + U1ntk + U3nt + εntk)]
)
dL(n) (3.2)
subject to aggregate budget inequality 3.1 and also the individual household time constraints
2.5 with respect to sequences (of random variables that are successively measurable with re-
spect to the information known at periods t =0 ,1,...) for consumption and labor supply
{xnt,hnt,b nt}T
t=0 chosen for all the cohort members n ∈ [0,1]. For future reference we denote the







The necessary conditions characterizing the optimal consumption, labor supply and birth
allocations are the basis for the estimation procedure. Turning to the derivation of optimal
consumption ﬁrst, we deﬁne β
tλt as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the aggregate fea-
sibility constraint. Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian formed from equation(3.2) and equation(3.1),





for all n ∈ [0,1] and t ∈ {0,1,...}. Notice that ηn corresponds to the inverse of the social
weight for each household n. In our empirical work we estimate Equation (3.3) using data on
7consumption and household demographics to obtain estimates of the social weight by inverting
an estimate of the estimated marginal utilities of wealth.
At the heart of the decision-maker’s trade oﬀ between working career and family, is the
fact that births and work reduce the amount of time left for leisure time, so they cannot be
solved independently. Since each person’s labor supply and birth decisions contribute only
inﬁnitesimally to aggregate output, they are valued at a constant rate each period λt by the
social planner. Thus we may represent the conditional valuation functions for household n










k=0 Iknt(U0ntk + U1ntk + ηnλrwnrhnr
−ηnλrπk(znr)bnr + εntk)) | Ijnt =1
¸
(3.4)
for j ∈ {0,1,2,3}.
Up to the household speciﬁc factor of proportionality ηn,t h et e r mVknt + εknt, denotes the
social value from n choosing option k at date t, conditional upon all the information available
to the social planner (and the household) at the beginning of time t. Whether each individual




1, if Vknt + εknt > Vjnt + εjnt ∀j 6= k
0, otherwise (3.5)
Upon deﬁning pknt as the conditional choice rate in period t, we obtain the probability of




This deﬁnition shows that if a representation for Vknt−Vjnt can be readily obtained in terms of
the variables and parameters that characterize the household’s problem, the parameters can be
estimated using standard approaches to estimating discrete choice models with labor supply and
other demographic data, including data on births. Our estimation approach uses the fact that





U0ntk + U1ntk + ηnλtwnthnt − ηnλtπ(znt)bnt
+βEt[
P3
k=0 pknt+1(Vknt+1+εknt+1)] | Ijnt =1
¸
(3.7)
We also use the fact that an interior solution for those participating in the labor force requires
∂V1nt\∂hnt =0or ∂V3nt\∂hnt =0 . Thus if Io

















The left side of Equation (3.8) gives the current beneﬁts and costs of spending a marginal hour
working, comprising a utility cost in terms of leisure foregone, and the value of the extra goods
and services produced. The right side shows the expected future beneﬁts. Marginally adjusting
current hours worked directly aﬀects future productivity as well as the beneﬁts of future leisure.
Moreover, supposing the probability of working next period increases next period from this
adjustment, the net beneﬁts of working next period should be applied to the increase. This is
captured in the second expression on the right side of Equation (3.8).
84. An Estimation Strategy
This framework is amenable to a multi-stage estimation strategy. First, there is contempora-
neous separability of consumption from labor supply and birth in the utility function. Second,
wages are assumed to be noisy measures of individual-speciﬁc marginal products of labor, which
are determined by our two forms of human capital accumulation, namely formal education, past
labor market participation and number of hours worked, plus other individual characteristics.
Provided the measurement error in wages is uncorrelated with current and past labor supply
and birth choices (an assumption we can readily test for providing a set of overidentifying in-
struments exist), the consumption and wages equations can be estimated separately from the
hours, participation and birth equations to provide estimates of the determinants of household
consumption and the eﬀects of human capital accumulation on the individual wages.
The representation of individuals’ valuation functions deﬁned by equations (3.4), and (3.8)
imply that the ﬁxed cost of participation, beneﬁt of a birth and cost of a birth can be recovered
from a model in which the income generated by the decision to work (jointly with the decision
to have a birth) is evaluated using the product of shadow value of consumption λt and the time-
invariant individual-speciﬁce ﬀect ηn. However, the existence of ﬁxed costs of participation,
birth beneﬁts, birth and the eﬀect of endogenous labor market participation, birth decision, and
the optimal choice of hours implies that techniques developed for dynamic discrete choice models
must be used to estimate the hours, participation and birth conditions. In principle one could
use one of the many maximum likelihood estimation (ML) procedures available (see e.g. Miller
(1984), Wolpin (1984), Pakes (1986), Rust (1987), etc.). This, however, involves the derivation of
the valuation function as a mapping of the state and parameter space to calculate the probability
of the sample outcome. Our model is very complicated in that it allows nonseparability of the
both birth and labor supply decision. This would make the computational cost of employing
ML in this setting very prohibitive. For this reason, we adapted a conditional choice probability
(CCP) estimator, which does not require us to solve the valuation functions.
The CCP estimator forms an alternative representation for the conditional valuation func-
tions that enter individuals’ optimizing conditions by multiplying current utilities, evaluated at
respective state for a given parameter value and corrected for dynamic selection bias, with the
probability that the state in question occurs, and then summing over all states. The proba-
bilities are estimated non-parametrically and then substituted into a criterion function that is
optimized over the structural parameters. Although CCP estimators are far more tractable than
ML, the computational burden of estimating conditional choice probabilities at every node in
the decision tree is great. We exploit the property of ﬁnite state dependence, enjoyed by our
model, to use the representation results from Altug and Miller (1998).
4.1. Conditional Choice Prababilities Estimation
The starting point for our CCP estimation is the discrete component of model, the euler equa-
tion can easily be estimated using standard GMM procedures. Without loss of generality, let
Hnt ≡ (z0
nt,µ nηnλtωt,h nt−ρ,...,hnt−1,d nt−ρ,...,dnt−1,b nt−ρ,...,bnt−1) represent the agent’s rel-
evant history as of the beginning of period t.In each period t, there is a current utility or payoﬀ,
Utj, associated with each cjoice j.Suppose we let U∗
j (Hnt)=E(Utj | Hnt) denote the conditional
9expectation of Utj,g i v e nHnt.We can then reformulate the model speciﬁed section 2 such that
Utj = U∗
j (Hnt)+εtj (4.1)
where the stochastic utility component, εtj, is by construction, conditionally independent of
Hnt.Let e U(Hnt)=( U∗
0(Hnt),...,U∗
3(Hnt))0 and e εt =( εt0,...,εt3)0, repectively, denote 3 × 1
vectors of deterministic and stochastic utility components. We write the distribution fuction of
e εt,given the the assumption of Type I Extreme Value distribution as:




which has a well-deﬁned, joint density function dG(e εt | Hnt). Then the discrete choice which
leads to the conditional valuation function in equation (3.5) can be stated as follows. First let
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k=0 ρkbnt−1 j =3
(4.4)
is the leisure from choosing the diferent options.
Pareto optimality implies that the decentralized problem is equivalent to the individual
problem, then the agent can be viewed as sequentially choosing {e It}T













s3)0 denote the agent’s optimal in period s.We deﬁne the conditional










j (Hnt)+εtj] | Hnt,I
(o)
tj =1 ) (4.6)
Then conditional on history Hnt,the probability the agent chooses action j is therefore:
pj(Hnt)=P r [ I{Vj(Hnt)+εtj≥Vk(Hnt)+εtk,∨k6=j}] (4.7)
Let e p(Hnt) ≡ (p1(Hnt),p 2(Hnt),p 3(Hnt))0 denote the 3 dimensional vector of conditional choice
probabilities associated with the last 3 actions in period t.
104.2. An Alternative Representation of Conditional Value Functions
In general, the conditional valuation function, Vj(Hnt), does not have a closed form solution. The
standard practice is to exploit Bellman’s(1957) equation and use backward recursion methods
to obtain one. This section provides an alternative representation of Vj(Hnt) which will prove
convenient when estimating this model in a multistage procedure.
To derive this representation, note(4.2) and (4.7) imply that the conditional probability of







For each j ∈ {1,2,3}, the expression corresponding to (4.8) is a positive, real-valued, map-
ping from the diﬀerences in conditional valuation functions associated with the optimal choice
and the alternative actions. We now show that these diﬀerences can be expressed as functions
of the conditional choice probabilities. Let e V (Hnt)=( V0(Hnt),V 1(Hnt),V 2(Hnt),V 3(Hnt))0 be
a 4-dimensional vector. For each period t and j ∈ {1,2,3},d e ﬁne the real-valued function,
Qj(e V,H nt),a s :




and e Q(e V,H nt), a 3-dimensional vector function as:
e Q(e V,H nt)=( Q1(e V,H nt),Q 2(e V,H nt),Q 3(e V,H nt))0 (4.10)
If e V comprises the diﬀerences in the conditional valuation functions, namely,
e V 0 =( V1 − V0,V 2 − V0,V 3 − V0)0 ≡ e V 0(Hnt) (4.11)
then e p(Hnt)=e Q(e V 0,H nt). The cornstone of this estimation strategy is the express e V 0 as a
function of e p(Hnt). This requirese Q(e V,H nt) to be invertible in e V 0. By proposition 1 of Hotz
and Miller(1993, p 501). This enables us to express Vj(Hnt) in terms of the choice probabilities,
transition probabilities and expected( per period ) payoﬀs associated with future histories. To
estimate the model we proceed in several steps. First we exploit the limited state dependency
structure of our model to derive an alternative representation of our value function. Inorder
better characterize the expected ( per period payoﬀs associated with future histories we deﬁne

















nt+s,µ nηnλt+sωt+s,h n,t−ρ+s,...,h n,t−1,b n,t−M+s,...,b n,t−1,h ∗
nt,...,0,0,...,0)0 (4.13)








nt+s,µ nηnλt+sωt+s,h n,t−ρ+s,...,h n,t−1,b n,t−M+s,...,b n,t−1,h ∗
nt,...,0,1,...,0)0 (4.15)
for s =1 ,...ρ,(i.e. ρ ≡ max(ρ,M)) where h∗
nt is the fraction of time a woman chooses to
spend at work conditional on participating, bn,t =( bnt,b nt−1,...,b nt−M)..The state vector
H
(s)
0nt is the state for a woman at date t + s who has accumulated work and birth histories,
(hn,t−ρ+s,...,h n,t−1)0 and (bn,t−M+s,...,bn,t−1)0 respectively, up to period t and then chooses
not to work or have a child at date t and for s − 1 periods following period t. The state
vector H
(ρ)
0nt corresponds to the labor market and birth histories in which the woman does not
participate in the labor force or have a child between t and t + ρ. Likewise H
(s)
1nt is the state
vector for a woman at time t+s who accumulates work and birth histories, (hn,t−ρ+s,...,hn,t−1)0
and (bn,t−M+s,...,b n,t−1)0 respectively, up to period t, chooses to participate in the labor force
in at date t but chooses not to have a child at date, and then chooses not to participate in the
labor force or have a child for s − 1 periods following period t. While H
(s)
2nt is the state vector
for a woman at time t + s who accumulates work and birth histories, (hn,t−ρ+s,...,hn,t−1)0 and
(bn,t−M+s,...,bn,t−1)0 respectively, up to period t, chooses to have a child at date t but chooses
not to participate in the labor force at date, and then chooses not to participate in the labor
f o r c eo rh a v eac h i l df o rs − 1 periods following period t. Finally, H
(s)
3nt is the state vector for
a woman at time t + s who accumulates work and birth histories, (hn,t−ρ+s,...,hn,t−1)0 and
(bn,t−M+s,...,bn,t−1)0 respectively, up to period t, chooses to have a child at date t and at
the same time chooses not to participate in the labor force at date, and then chooses not to
participate in the labor force or have a child for s − 1 periods following period t. Since we
assume the we have limited state dependencies only histories up to ρ are going to be relevant
for decisions in the current period. Also let
 j(pj(Hnt)) = E(εtj | Hnt,I
(o)
tj =1 ) (4.16)











We can derive an alternative expression for Vj(Hnt) by using the deﬁnitions of Q
−1
j (pj(Hnt))
for j ∈ {1,2,3}, substituting for Q
−1
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jnt )) +  k(pk(H
(ρ+1)
jnt )) −  0(p0(H
(ρ+1)
jnt ))]]}(4.22)
Using equation(4.9) it follows from proposition 1 in Hotz and Miller(1993, p. 501) that
Q
−1
k (e p(Hnt) is :
Q
−1
j (e p(Hnt)=l n [ pj(Hnt)/p0(Hnt)] (4.23)
To complete the expression for Vj(Hnt), we need to characterise the form of the  j(pj(Hnt))
functions associated with εtj. Given the the assumed distribution for ε0
tjs, the function takes
the form:
 j(pj(Hnt)) = γ − ln[pj(Hnt)] (4.24)
for j ∈ {0,1,2,3} ,w h e r eγ is Euler’s constant (≈ 0.577).I n t h i s c a s e , Q
−1
j (e p(Hnt)=−[
 j(pj(Hnt)) −  0(p0(Hnt))], which implies that the conditional valuation functions do not de-





jnt)) +  k(pk(H
(s)
jnt)) −  0(p0(H
(s)
jnt)), drops out under this parame-
terization of the unobservables.
13Finally inorder to estimate the model we will form moment conditions using equation4.23,
i.e.
ln[pj(Hnt)/p0(Hnt)] = Vj − V0 (4.25)
Substituting for Vj and V0 from equation(4.22) and not all terms in that expression that
























tj =1 } =0
(4.26)
for j =1 ,2,3 and t =1 ,...,T.
We then derive addtional moment conditions which responds to the continuous decision of
number hours to work. In this way we are able to combine both the continuous and decrete
decision in the same framework. Note that equation (4.22) also gives a alternative representation
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for j = {1,3}, conditional on these choices being optimal.









jnt | Ijn,t+s =1 ) (4.28)
as the probability density function forH
(s)






as the related probability density that does not condition on choosing option j in period t + s.




























The moment conditions deﬁned in equations 4.26 and 4.27 now deﬁne moment restrictions
which we can use to estimate the model, except for the incidental parameters in the form
of the conditional choice probabilities , future transitional probabilities, their derivatives, the
individual eﬀects and aggregate components. In that respects we ﬁrst estimate the these
incidental parameters in separate stages ( nonparametrically or parametrically) and substitute
their estimate into the above moment conditions. As such we have a semiparametric estimation
procedure, we derive the asymptotic properties in the appendix. In what follows we ﬁrst describe
the data and then go into more details for each stage of the estimation procedure..
145. Data
The data for this study are taken from the Family-Individual File, Childbirth and Adoption
History File and the Marriage History File of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The variables used in the empirical study are hnt, the annual fraction of hours work by
individual n at date t; e wnt, her reported real average hourly earnings at t; xnt,r e a lh o u s e h o l df o o d
consumption expenditures; FAM nt, the number of household members; YKID nt,t h en u m b e r
of children less than six years of age; OKIDnt, the number of children of ages between six and
fourteen; AGEnt, the age of the individual at date t; EDUnt, the years of completed education
of the individual at time t; HIGH.SCHnt, completion of high school dummy; BLACK and
HISPANIC race dummies for blacks and Hispanics, respectively; NEnt,N C nt,SOnt,w h i c h
are region dummies for northeast, northcentral, and south, respectively, and MARnt, denoting
whether a woman is married or not. The construction of our sample and the deﬁnition of the
variables is described in greater detail in Appendix 3.
Table 1 contains summary statistics of our main variables. The sample has aged, household
size has declined, and the decline is most pronounced amongst young children. The steep decline
in household size over the two decades, and the aging evident in the sample, relative to aggregate
trends in the US, largely reﬂects the sampling mechanism of the PSID. Thus we cannot infer
any aggregate trend in fertility from this table. Household income has increased somewhat,
but household consumption of food has declined. However, both food consumption and income
per capita has increased over the sample period. More striking is the rise in female income,
which greatly outstrips increases in household income. This is due to both higher wages and
greater hours. Because schooling has not increased over the sample period, the number of years
of formal education is not a factor in explaining aggregate trends in female wages and labor
supply, or any changes that might have occurred in fertility.
6. Wages
We assume the wage rate, or value of marginal product function, Equation (2.1) can be para-
meterized as:






where µn and ωt are an unobserved individual-speciﬁce ﬀect and aggregate time-speciﬁc wage,
respectively. We further assume that the reported wage rate, denoted e wnt (for the nth household
in period t) measures the woman’s marginal product in the market sector with error, so that:
e wnt = g( e Ant)exp( e εnt) (6.2)
where the multiplicative error term in equation (6.2) is conditionally independent over people,
the covariates in the wage equation and the labor supply decision. Taking logarithms on both
sides of Equation (6.2), and then diﬀerencing, yields:
154e εnt = 4ln(e wnt) −
ν X
s=1
(δ1s4hn,t−s + δ2s4dn,t−s) − 4z0
ntB3 − 4ωt (6.3)
≡ 4ln(e wnt) − ZntΘ1 (6.4)
where Θ1 ≡ (δ11,...,δ1ν,δ21,...,δ2ν,B0
3) denotes the (2ν + k + T − 1)− dimensional vector of
identiﬁable parameters, and Znt is the vector of covariates.
An instrumental variables estimator was used to estimate Equation (6.3). Deﬁning Yn and
Zn as:
Yn ≡ (4ln(e wn2),...,4ln(e wnT))0
Zn ≡ (Zn2,...,ZnT)0













where f Wn is a consistent estimator of:
Wn ≡ E[(Yn − Z0
nΘ1)(Yn − Z0
nΘ1)0 p Zn].
Assuming the regressors are valid instuments for the wage equation, that is to say E(4e εnt |Zn)=
0 for each t, then ΘN
1 has the lowest asymptotic covariance within the class of GMM estimators.
Our estimates of the wage equation, displayed in Table III, are comparable to those reported
in Miller and Sanders (1997) for the National Longitudinal Survey for Youth (NLSY), Altug
and Miller (1998) also using the PSID, and others. All the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant. Working
an extra hour increases the wage rate up to four years hence, although in diminishing amounts.
The eﬀect is nonlinear, and this is captured by the participation variables. Age has a quadratic
eﬀect, eventually leading to declining productivity, and additional education mitigates the onset
of the decline. We note that the linear terms on age are not identiﬁed.
The estimate quantitative magnitudes of past experience are also plausible. Recent working
experience is more valuable than more distant experience: at 2000 hours per year, the wage
elasticity of hours lagged once is about 0.18, but the wage elasticity of hours lagged twice is only
0.03. Also the further back the work experience is, the less the timing matters; an extra hour
worked one year in the past has about twice the eﬀect on current wages as an extra hour worked
two years in the past, but the diﬀerence between the wage eﬀects of an extra hour worked three
and four years in the past, respectively, is less than 40%.
Another measure of the eﬀect of past labor supply on wages: consider the total change in
wages for a woman who has not worked up to date t − ρ and then works the sample average of
hours for those women who work, denoted ht. Then this measure is given by
P4
s=1[δ1sht−s +
δ2s]=0 .12. Much of this long-term eﬀect is due to hours worked in the past year. Speciﬁcally,
the growth in wages between t−1 and t for a woman who does not participate from t−ρ to t−2,
but works the sample average at t−1 is δ11h,t−s +δ21 =0 .08. On the other hand, women who
16worked less than 1000 hours the previous year do not receive this increase in wages, this may
be capturing the eﬀect of discouragement normally found in the standard job search model. It
should be noted that we do not explicitly model this type of search cost in our model, however,
we can pick up the lower bound of this eﬀect. This means that not everybody gets the beneﬁt
from past job experience, there is a threshold number of hours of about 1500 for this positive
eﬀect to kick in. This will impact fertility behavior even more than if there were positive beneﬁt
from all levels of past hours, since a mother could reduce her hours and still continue to enjoy
the beneﬁt of higher future wages. We will come back to this point in the empirical ﬁndings
section when we will have estimates of the fraction of time a mother spends nuturing her new
born.
The estimated change in aggregate wages over our sample period is displayed in Figure I,
along with its 99% conﬁdence interval. The most striking feature of that plot is that although the
magnitude of the changes ﬂuctuate over the sample period, the signs are always positive. This
shows that over time the aggregate females wage has been increasing. This is not a surprising
ﬁnding, given the fact the wage gap between males and females having been closing over time.
However it does raise an interesting issue as to whether the attachment of females to the labor
force, in term of their persistence in labor participation, is having an aggregate eﬀect. For
example, suppose by more females working more hours and participating on a more consistent
level equivalent to men, then the employers in the aggregate are willing to pay females higher
wages closer to males. This higher wages, some would argue, would then cause females to work
more and have less children. Our approach can also disentangled such a result by controlling
for aggregate shock, and then seeing the relative importance of the wage eﬀect.
7. Preferences over Consumption and Wealth Eﬀects
In our model, the eﬀects of diﬀerences in wealth across households on their fertility and labor
supply decisions is determined a single parameter, their weight in the social planner’s problem.
The inverse of their social weight is their marginal utility of wealth, and it can be estimated with
household data on consumption This section reports our estimates of the parameters determining
the utility from consumption and the marginal utility of wealth parameter, to be used in the
labor supply and fertility equations that follow.
7.1. The ﬁrst order condition
We assume that preferences over consumption take the parametric form:
u3(xnt,z nt,ε 5nt)=e x p ( z0
ntB2 + ε5nt)xα
nt/α (7.1)
where the concavity parameter α<1. Substituting equation (7.1) into equation (3.3), taking
logarithms and then ﬁrst diﬀerencing yields:
(1 − α)−1 4 ε5nt = 4ln(xnt) − (1 − α)−1 4 z0
ntB2 +( 1− α)−1 ln(λt) (7.2)
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where Dt denotes a time dummy for t ∈ {2,...,T}. T h ea s s u m p t i o n si nS e c t i o n2i m p l yt h a t
the unobserved variable ε5nt is independent of individual speciﬁc characteristics. Therefore
E((1 − α)−1 4 ε5nt |znt)=0 . Substituting for (1 − α)−1 4 ε5nt using equation(7.2) one can
obtain a set of orthogonality conditions:
E [(Yn − ZnΘ2)Zn]=0
which can be exploited here to estimate Θ2 using a similar method to the regression procedures
that estimated the wage function.
The estimates of the consumption equation are based on the main sample of females for the
years 1968 to 1992. Consumption for a given year in our study is measured by taking 0.25 of
the value of the diﬀerent components for year t − 1 and 0.75 of it for year t.T h i si se x p l a i n e d
in more detail in the data appendix. The elements of znt used in this stage of the estimation
are deﬁned as FAM nt,YK I D nt,O K I D nt,A G E 2
nt,N C nt and SOnt. The estimates in Table 4
show that consumption increases with family siz ea n dc h i l d r e nc o n s u m eless than adults, since
the coeﬃcients on children between the ages of zero and fourteen are negative and smaller in
absolute magnitude than the coeﬃcient on total household size. Furthermore, the behavior of
consumption over the life-cycle is concave since the coeﬃcient on age squared is negative. All
the other coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant. Figure IV shows the estimated aggregate component of
shadow value of consumption, along with its 99% conﬁdence interval. This shows that these
components are estimated very precisely. In fact, there is also signiﬁcant variation over time
as the test statistic for the null hypothesis that (1 − α)
−1 ∆ln(λt)=( 1− α)
−1 ∆ln(λt−1) for
t = 1969,...,1992 is 395. Under the null hypothesis, it would be distributed as a χ2 with 23
degrees of freedom, implying rejection of the null at 99% signiﬁcance levels.
7.1.1. Individual-speciﬁcE ﬀects
Estimation of the labor supply and fertility equations also requires estimates of individual-
speciﬁce ﬀects ηnµn and ηn. There are two approaches that we shall employ for estimating
there quantities, the traditional ﬁxed eﬀects estimators and the regression approach of Macurdy
(1982), extended by Altug and Miller (1998) to handle nonlinearities using nonparametric es-
timation techniques. The traditional estimators are simple to compute. They are, however,
subject to small sample bias arising from short panel length, although the limited Monte Carlo
18evidence provided in Hotz and Miller (1988) suggests that small sample bias might not greatly
aﬀect the estimates of the other parameters. On the other hand, the nonparametric estima-
tor achieves consistency of the cross section of the panel data set, but can only deal with any
unobserved permanent characteristic that is a mapping of observed random variables.
The traditional ﬁxed eﬀect are estimated as follows. Let T1 denote the number of time
periods for which the wage equation is estimated, and T2 be the number of time periods for
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[ln(xnt) − (1 − α)−1z0
ntB2 +( 1− α)−1 ln(λt)]/T2 (7.4)
Then estimates of ηnµn and ηn are then estimated by simple time averages of the estimated
residuals of the consumption and wage equations.
Suppose that ηnµn and ηn can be expressed as functions of a Q-dimensional vector of regres-
sors zn, which is assumed to represent the permanent characteristics of individual n. Let the vec-
tor zn be observed and satisﬁes the conditions, E[zn(φ1n− ηnµn)] = 0 and E[zn(φ2n−ηn)] = 0.
Here zn could include such observed observable demographic characteristics as religion, marital
status, the age distribution of children, home ownership, educational level and geographical lo-
cation. Let δN denote the bandwidth of the proposed kernel estimator and J the normal kernel























N (zm − zn)]
(7.6)
The distribution of the estimated ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates for the wage equation, the con-
sumption equation, and the combined individual eﬀects and time eﬀects of the consumption,
are displayed in ﬁgures II, III, IV and V respectively. The most stricking features of these plots
is that the nonparametric estimates are signiﬁcantly smoother than the traditional ﬁxed eﬀects.
The range of the distribution of the shadow price of consumption all lies above zero, while only
a very small portion of the estimated (inverse) social weights lies below zero in the traditional
case.
198. Participation, Hours and Birth
8.1. A Parametrization











In these expressions, B0 are parameters that characterize the ﬁxed-costs of participating in
the work force, B1 shows the eﬀect of exogenous time-varying characteristics on the marginal




s=1 δslnt−s > 0 and δ0 < 0. The parameters δs for s =1 ,...,ρ capture intertemporal
non-separabilities in preferences with respect to leisure choices. A value of δs < 0 for s =1 ,...,ρ
means that leisure s periods ago increases the marginal utility of leisure, and results in less work
and child cre time today. Equivalently, a ﬁnding of δs < 0 implies that current and past leisure
time are substitutes where as δs > 0 implies that current and past leisure time are complements.
The distributional assumption for the idiosyncratic stocks and the parameterization of the
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(8.5)
208.2. Nonparametric estimation of the conditional choice probabilities
Then the probabilities pknt can be computed as nonlinear regressions of participation index
Iknt on the current state HN





mr)] as a given kernel , where δN is the bandwidth associated with each argument.
Then the nonparametric estimate, pN




















The conditional choice probabilities pj(H
(s)
knt) are also estimated as nonlinear regressions of






(1 − Ikn,t− ),k ∈ {0,1,2,3} (8.7)
Notice that I
(s)
knt =1if the person choose option k at t − s, but then did not choose option
k for s − 1 periods. Thus, I
(s)
kntis an index variable that allows us to condition on the behavior
of individuals with the labor market and birth histories deﬁned by z
(s)








































n )0 for k ∈ {0,1,2,3} is the state vector for individual n.
8.3. Hours, participation and birth Conditions
So combining the estimate we obtain in section 7.1.1 gives
ξnt =( 1− α)−1 \ ln(λtηn) (8.9)
Note that we can obtain an estimate of ηnλt and ηn, respectively, as:
[ ηnλt ≡ exp((1 − α)ξnt) (8.10)
The remaining unknown parameters of the model consist of the parameters in the hours,
participation ond birth equations, the discount factor β and the risk aversion parameter from
the utility function for consumption, α.Deﬁne the (3K+ρ+ρ+2)−dimemensional vector Θ3 ≡
(B0
0,B 1,0 δ0,...,δρ,γ0,...,γρ,γS,α,π)0. We do not estimate the discount factor because of problem
with identitifying it, this is a standard problem most dynamic structural models so instead we
estimate the model using diﬀerent value of β. This fact motivates an estimator of Θ3, conditional
21on β. For this purpose, the idiosyncratic errors or moment restrictions associated with the Euler
and discrete choice equations can be written as
b m1nt(Θ3)=I1nt ×
⎛
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Let b mnt(Θ3) ≡ (b m1nt, b m2nt, b m3nt, b m4nt)0 and let T3 denote the set of periods for which
the hours and discrete participation conditions are valid. Deﬁne b mn(Θ3) ≡ (b m0
n1,...,b m0
nT3)0
as the the vector of moment restrictions for a given individual over time. Similarly, deﬁne
Φn ≡ Et[b mn(Θ3)b mn(Θ3)0]. Notice that the matrix Φn is block diagonal with diagonal ele-
ments deﬁned as Φnt ≡ Et[b mnt(Θ3)b mnt(Θ3)0],a n do ﬀ-diagonal elements that are zero because
Et[b mnt(Θ3)b mns(Θ3)0]=0for s 6= t, s<t .The 4 × 4 conditional heteroscedasticity matrix
b Φnt associated with the indivdiual-speciﬁc errors b mnt(Θ3) is evaluated using a nonparametric
estimator based on the estimated residuals, b mnt(Θ3), using an initial consistent estimator of
Θ3.This estimator is simalar to Robinson(1987) estimator except we use a kernel based non-
parametric regressions instead of a Nearest neighbor regression approach. To ensure none zero
variance we trimmed the data. The optimal GMM estimator for, Θ3 satisﬁes




n=1 b mn(Θ3)]b Φn[1/N
PN
n=1 b mn(Θ3)]0. (8.15)
Appendix A.3 derives that asymptotic properties of a general class of estimators which can be
used to show consistency and asymptotic nomality of the estimator b Θ3.
229. Empirical Findings
Tables V, VI, VII and VIII contain estimates of alternative estimators of our participation
cost,nurturing cost, utility of leisure and birth equation. Column (1) reports estimates of the
birth preference and cost parameters that are based on nonparametric estimates of individual
eﬀects ηn and µnηn, while estimates in column (2) are based on the standard eﬀects estima-
tors of ηn and µnηn. The most striking feature of our results is the similarities between both
sets of estimates. Given these similarities, we will focus in the discussion that follows on the
nonparametric estimates.
9.1. Fixed Cost of Participation
Table V contains estimates of the ﬁxed cost of participation. First the constant term is negative,
which means that particiaption in the labor force has a ﬁxed utility cost instead of a beneﬁt,
which is what standard economic theory would predict. Age reduces this cost of participation
in the labor, but this reduction is at a decreasing rate as the parameter estimate on the AGE2
is negative. Education increases the cost associated with age. There is a negative sign on
the estimates of AGE×EDUC which implies that a more educated female has a higher cost of
participation for a given age than a less educated female. To understand the overall eﬀect of
age and education on the ﬁxed cost of participation, we investigate what is the shape of this
function conditional on education. Females with less that 7.7 years of education have a concave
function in age, while females with more that 7.7 years of education have the cost of participation
increasing at an increasing rate in age. One possible explanation for this result maybe the fact
that less educated females will earn less over their life-time and as they get older will not have
the discretion of whether to work are not. So in the data we would expect to observe that
older females with small levels of education to be participating in the labor force at a higher
rate. Married women have a higher cost of participation while blacks and hispanics have a lower
cost of participation for a given age and education level. Again these results are not surpising
since the standard literature has documented similar results( see for example Altug and Miller
(1998))..
9.2. Nurturing Cost
Table VI contains the results from the estimation of the fraction of time spent nurturing a child.
The risk aversion parameter is very reasonable for a CES utility function. These estimates
seems quite reasonable. For example, a new birth seems to require about 35% of the mother’s
time, and this falls to about 16% for a ﬁve years old child. These are similar results to those
found by Hotz and Miller (1984) which found that these parameters follow oﬀ ag e o m e t r i cr a t e .
This is very important in our model, since with the nonlinearity observed in the estimates of
the wage equation, this implies that if a female reduces her time in the labor force to have a
child, then they would not beneﬁt from the increases in wages as a result of human capital
accumulation in terms of their previous labor supply. So holding all other things constant, this
would make having children less desirable for a female who is on a high wage trojectury. This
combined with the estimates of the risk aversion parameter means that females would like to
smooth more there consumption, hence working more in earlier years and delaying child-bearing
23to later years. This would mean that working females would have less children than nonworking
female.
9.3. Utility Cost of Leisure
Table VII contains the estimates for the utility cost of leisure. Although the sign on the lnt is
negative this do not mean that females in our sample obtain a negative utility from leisure, which
would contradict theory, we have to look at the over all ﬁrst order eﬀect of lnt. For example, for an
average women in our sample, the direct eﬀect on the utility from leisure is positive .The second
order eﬀects of leisure( i.e. term on the the squared of leisure) is negative giving us the standard
concave utility function in our results. Our estimates suggest that leisure is intertemporily
nonseparable. Past leisure are compliments with for current leisure These is similar to what
is found in Altug and Miller (1998), among other, about the separability of leisure. Another,
supprising results we found is that the sign on marriage in our results is negative. At ﬁrst glance,
this would imply that married females love leisure less. One explanation for this eﬀect could be
simple the fact that married females are working more than before and is still having children.
Since we do not allow at the moment for the utility of birth or the time cost of raring a child to
depend on such demographics, as marital status, then the only way they found then be having
children and still working is if they as a group love leisure less. Another explanation may be
due to the welfare system.In the era of our sample, a subsistence income (AFDC) is available
to unmarried mothers, but (basically) only conditional on them not working. Married females
do not face a similar tradeoﬀ. Since welfare participation among female heads is quite common
in this era (roughly around one-third), this is deﬁnitely an important enough phenomenon to
account for this results.In short, the ”leisure” time of female heads is highly subsidized, and they
may well have similar preferences as wives.9 This is some thing that we will explore further.
9.4. Birth Eﬀects
We concurred with the classical literature that children are good and not bad, since we ﬁnd a
positive utility up to the 6th birth. The parameter on the timing of births for example, would
imply that the optimal space of a two-child family would be 3 to 4 years apart. So, having
children too close or too far apart is less desirable. Turning to the cost of a child, we ﬁnd that
both sets of estimates give similar results. There is a positive cost discounted life-time cost to
having a child. We ﬁnd that having at least a high school education signiﬁcantly increases that
cost. After controlling for education, we ﬁnd that Blacks and Hispanics have a signiﬁcantly
lower cost than White. The fact that education signiﬁcantly increases the cost of having a birth
coincides with our earlier hypothesis, and can help explain the unanimous empirical ﬁnding that
number of children is negatively related to level of education.
10. Policy Simulations
There are many ways in which public policy over the last century has aﬀected the costs and
beneﬁts of having children. From child labor laws to the public provision of schooling, from
the subsidizing of health care to local taxes that support amenities such as swimming pools, as
9We would like to thank Elizabeth Powers for pointing out this very insightful possibility to us.
24well as sporting and other events for children, raising children depends on social infrastructure
that is often taken for granted in modern developed societies. Over the last several decades,
greater attention has been paid to jointly determining fertility and female labor supply. Part of
the concern about the falling rates of fertility are related to the long-term viability of the social
security system in many developed countries, especially in Western Europe.
This section considers a variety of policies that subsidize fertility to investigate how responsive
women are to changes in the incentives they factor in between market work and raising a family.
Our study shows that diﬀerent policies not only have diﬀerent aggregate or average eﬀects on
fertility and female labor supply, but also have very signiﬁcant compositional eﬀects, or incidence
across this heterogeneous population. We hasten to add that our contribution is postitive, not
normative, seeking to provide quantitative analysis against which diﬀerent policy options can
be evaluated.
10.1. Overview of the simulations
We substituted the parameters obtained from our estimation procedures into the utility function,
the equation characterizing the returns to experience, and the child care cost equation and solved
the decision-maker’s problem. We conducted simulations for a wide range of female types in
the population, but they are not exhaustive. We stratiﬁed the population, breaking down the
groups according to a three-way classiﬁcation scheme, by race, marriage and education, and
considered an individual whose unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects correspond to the estimated means
of the distributions. Three racial types were considered, namely Black, White and Hispanic
(respectively abbreviated B, H and M in Tables IX and X below). Marriage was a dichotomous
variable partitioning women by marital status at age 25, where M denotes she was married at age
25 or before, and U if not. We considered three educational groups, those who completed some
years at college (denoted by the inequality sign >), those who completed some years at high
school but not college (denoted by HS), and those with less education than that (denoted by a
< sign). Thus our simulations apply to women in the 18 categories whose marginal utilities’ of
wealth, and whose endowed marginal product of labor (controlling for schooling and experience),
correspond to the estimated sample means.
The models we simulated are slightly less complex than the estimation framework itself in
three ways. The ﬁrst simpliﬁcation was to limit the choice set. Rather than assuming that
workers made a discrete choice about whether to participate in the labor force or not with a
continuous hours choice, we discretized the labor supply choice set facing workers, limiting them
to 10 equally spaced choices in the [0,1] interval. Second, we linearized the value of marginal
consumption around the marginal utility of consumption achieved in the current regime. Thus
in the objective function (2.9), U3ntk is replaced with e U3ntk ≡ η−1
n . Third, we investigated
an economy where there are no aggregate shocks. As a practical matter, the quantitative
signiﬁcance of aggregate demographic shocks (such as the baby boom in the U.S., the AIDS crisis
in Botswana and other countries, the eﬀects on fertility of immigration both legal and illegal
into U.S. and parts of Western Europe) is diﬃcult to overstate, and we think that excluding
them is the main reason why our results should be treated cautiously.
The model was solved for each group under ﬁve policy regimes. The benchmark regime,
labelled Estimation, is the current one, which may be compared with the conditional sample
means from the data set. In the ﬁrst two alternative regimes we analyze the subsidy to having
25children does not vary with the recipient, although the value a mother places on the scheme
depends on her wealth and wage rate. In the regime labelled Expenses, the state pays all the
estimated monetary costs associated with raising children, removing the wedge in the marginal
utility of wealth between households that have children and those that do not. Under the
Daycare policy, maternal time is replaced with publicly funded child care centers. In the other
two regimes the payment mothers receive depends on her wages and hours she worked before
taking time oﬀ to have a child. The Wages policy would pay the mother the wages she would
have received if she had decided against having her child. If the Retraining policy is adopted,
mothers are given retraining upon reentering the workforce that fully restore the human capital
from lost workforce experience.
In our model there are three costs associated with childcare: the lifetime discounted cost of
market inputs used up raising a child, the direct time cost in terms of the required for nurturing,
and the human capital accumulation cost stemming from the experience acquired from working
that is not used when women quit the labor force to have children. We will provide the costs of
each policy in a future version of this paper.
10.2. Solving the Model
We ﬁrst simulated the prediction of the model for females in each of the categories described
above over the 25 years of a partial life cycle starting at age 20, for use as a bench mark case.
This requires us to solve 18 valuation functions for the optimization problem each type solved,
obtain the optimal decision rules, and thus compute the probabilities of observing any given
decision, as a mapping of the state variables, which in this case are the vector of lagged labor
supplies and a vector for the ages of the oﬀspring. An appendix describes the algorithm in
detail. Brieﬂy, we combined the use of both policy function iteration (using Newton steps) with
value function iteration (using the contraction operator on the value function). Convergence to
the solution of the inﬁnite horizon problem occurred relatively quickly, typically within seven
iterations.
The labor force participation rate and expected fertility rate over this period (essentially the
TFR) for each type is reported in the second column of Tables IX and X under the heading of
Estimation. A sense of how representative our groups are is found by comparing the simulated
results for our estimated model with their corresponding sample means in the ﬁrst column,
headed Actual. Note that the numbers are not very close, although many of the inequalities
within each column are preserved. This is attributable to two factors. The ﬁrst is estimation
error. The second is that the sample means do not condition on the values of the unobservables,
which enter in a highly nonlinear way into the participation and fertility choices. To separate
out these separate inﬂuences, we will nonparametrically estimate the same set of statistics for
that person in the group with the estimated mean ﬁxed eﬀects, which simply weights the data
used to obtain the averages in the ﬁrst column by how close each observation is to the mean
estimated ﬁxed eﬀect vector.
Table IX shows most of the types have fertility rates below the replacement rate of 2. For
example, the TFR of all the college educated groups are all below the replacement rate. College
educated white females bear the least number of children (1.1 for the group as a whole and 1.2
at the mean ﬁxed eﬀects), and black married females with less than high school education the
most (2.1 for the overall group and 2.4 at the mean ﬁxed eﬀects).
26In most, but not all groups, those married by 25 bear more children than those who had
not married by then. Table X shows that, with the notable exception of college educated
whites, unmarried women are more likely to participate in the labor force. At 0.93, the labor
force participation rate for a married college educated white female with the mean ﬁxed eﬀects
exceeds all other groups, closely followed by unmarried college educated black women (at 0.91).
Across education achievement and marital status but within race categories, blacks exhibit the
biggest range in labor force participation rates. The exact derivation is presented in more details
in Appendix 1.
10.3. Childcare Support
There are many ways to subsidize fertility by having the state pay for the discounted lifetime
cost of children. For example, it could be achieved though tax credits at upper income levels and
child support payments for those who do not receive enough taxable income. In this framework
this is equivalent to imposing the constraints π0 =0and π1 =0in the expression for child care
costs:
π (znt)=π0 + z0
ntπ1
The total fertility and labor force participation rates that are induced by this subsidy are
shown in the third columns of Tables IX and X. Paying the market goods inputs for raising
children has a substitution and wealth eﬀects. In a static model, the substitution eﬀect induces
women to have more children and reduce their own consumption of leisure and other goods,
while the wealth eﬀect induces them to increase their consumption of leisure and children. The
results of the dynamic simulations lend support to this intuition. In 16 of the 18 groups labor
force participation declines, and in all but one instance fertility rises, 6 groups (compared to 4)
now settling above the replacement rate. The 3 types whose fertility behavior is most sensitive
to this policy shift are the married non-college educated black female and the unmarried lowest
educated black female. By way of contrast the biggest reduction in labor force participation
rate is amongst unmarried high school educated whites.
10.4. Daycare
Rather than pay for market inputs directly, another public policy for subsidizing fertility is to
expand the availability of child care services for the mothers of infants and preschool age children,
by ﬁnancially supporting centers, or reimbursing mothers who place their children in them. In
our framework a policy that eliminates the maternal time inputs altogether would set ρi =0for
i ∈ {1,...,5}. This increases the amount of time mothers of young children have for leisure and
work. In a static model of fertility and labor supply, fertility increase in response to a reduction
in one of its factor inputs, maternal time. Furthermore, the time freed up from looking after
children is distributed between extra leisure, and working for more goods and services over and
above those used up by the additional children. Consequently, one predicts that both fertility
and labor supply would increase, the latter less than the amount of time released from child
care.
The fourth column shows the labor force participation and fertility outcomes from solving the
optimization problem under the Daycare policy. As expected all the group exhibit higher fertility
rates, 12 now at or above the replacement rate of 2.0, with married high school educated white
27females registering the biggest increase (from a TFR of 1.52 to 2.30). Comparing the eﬀects on
TFR across diﬀerent groups, we see that switching from subsidizing market inputs to replacing
maternal time inputs has a far greater impact on females with some college education than
those who did not complete high school. Indeed in just one group, married blacks who did not
complete high school, TFR would actually fall from 2.63 to 2.41 if subsidizing market inputs were
replaced with subsidizing maternal inputs. This ﬁnding demonstrates that the type of subsidy
to child care helps determine not just the aggregate level of births, but also their composition
within diﬀerent types of households.
The change in labor force participation rates are more ambiguous, in fact puzzling. Since
returns from experience on the job is likely to strengthen attachment to the labor force beyond
that predicted by the static model, we are further investigating this counter-intuitive result.
10.5. Paid Maternity Leave
Paying females wages when they take maternity leave is a third way of promoting higher fertility.
A distinguishing feature of this policy is that women with high wages receive greater payment
than those receiving lower wages. (Note that if the payment is a ﬁxed allowance, then the
analysis of Expenses policy applies.) In contrast to the two previous schemes, (each of which
has only one degree of freedom, the proportion of costs or time covered), this scheme has two,
what percentage of her market wage a mother is paid while on maternity leave, and the maximum
eligibility period per child. Under the Wages policy, mothers are paid the wage they would have
received if they had not given birth, and the maximum eligibility period is the amount of time
they would have withdrawn from the workforce in the absence of the subsidy. These variables
are for the most part negatively correlated, and therefore aﬀect the total payment in oﬀsetting
directions.
In particular, suppose the woman gives birth at period t, let ho
n,t+s (bnt =0 )denote the
woman’s labor supply s periods after the birth had she not left the workforce to give birth, let
wo
n,t+s (bnt =0 )denote her wage rate had she not given birth, and let τ0
n denote the number of
periods she would have taken oﬀ if there were no provisions for paid maternity leave. Then in
this policy regime the wage payment she receives upon having a child is:
Xτn
s=0 λn,t+swo
n,t+s (bnt =0 )ho
n,t+s (bnt =0 )
In a static framework, paid maternity leave induces women to reduce their labor supply
and have larger families. In our dynamic framework paying wages does not fully compensate a
mother for taking maternity leave, because job market experience acquired before giving birth
depreciates over the time spent out of the labor force. Consequently, females who decide to
have a child because of the paid maternity leave may simply exit the labor force permanently if
their market capital has depleted suﬃciently quickly. This scenario certainly arises when, in the
absence of the paid leave policy, women essentially choose between having a career and having
af a m i l y .
Our preliminary simulation results are displayed in the ﬁfth columns of Tables IX and X.
They show that in 13 out of the 18 cases the labor supply participation falls, because of the
substitution eﬀect into child rearing activities, and the compounding eﬀect of human capital
depletion. Although total fertility rates increase in all categories, this policy is not as eﬀective
28as directly paying for the time inputs; in every category fertility rates under subsidized Daycare
exceed those in attained when there is paid maternity leave as mandated in Wages.
10.6. Retraining
In our framework mothers lose human capital from temporarily withdrawing from the labor
force. The last counter factual regime we consider does not make any payments to mothers,
but oﬀers partial compensation by putting women returning to work from maternity leave on
an equal footing with those who chose not to have children. The policy scheme simulated in
Retraining restores them to the wage trajectory they would have been on if they not withdrawn
from the workforce to have children. In our framework the labor force experience over the
previous ν periods helps determine the current wage. Thus, if the female in Model 4 reenters
τ4






n,t−s (bnt =0 )+δ2sdo
n,t−s (bnt =0 )
¤
The last columns of Tables IX and X display th er e s u l t s ,w h i c hi ns o m ew a y sa r et h em o s t
dramatic. The total fertility rate of every group except the unmarried white females with less
than high school education rises above the replacement rate, and for one group, married black
females with high school education, reaches 3.
11. Conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic model of female labor supply and fertility behavior and estimates
its structural parameters. Previous empirical research on female labor supply had shown that
current labor supply choices aﬀect future wages and utility through intertemporal nonsepara-
bilites in the production function (such as through learning by doing or staying in practice), and
in utility (for example, through the household production function and also possibly due to the
intertemporal nature of utility from leisure). In addition, there are a small number of studies
of fertility behavior that suggest the timing of later births is partly determined by economic
factors. Our study nests both kinds of dynamic interactions within a uniﬁed structural model.
Our empirical results reaﬃrm ﬁndings from previous work, and provide a set of parameters
that capture the costs and beneﬁts of having children within a dynamic structural framework.
More speciﬁcally, our estimates reaﬃrm the importance of nonseparabilites in labor supply
choices. Wages are increased by experience up to four years in the past, recent experience
counting the most. In addition, we reject the null hypothesis that leisure is intertemporally
separable, our estimates suggesting that there is also learning by doing in home-making activities.
With regards to fertility previous work estimating linear index functions and fertility hazards
had found that the timing of later births depended on the ages of older siblings. Although there
is not much in the literature with which we can directly compare our ﬁndings, our estimated
costs and beneﬁts of children are plausible. They imply that households view children as good,
not bad, thus suggesting that households limit their size because of the time and money costs
associated with raising oﬀspring, not because adults do not like having oﬀspring. Our estimates
show that there is an optimal gestation period with respect to births that is partly determined
by the same economic factors that have played a role in reducing TFR over the past generation
29or two, a ﬁnding which is consistent with previous work on the spacing of births over the life
cycle.
With respective the aggregate wage eﬀect on labor force participation and fertility behavior
of females, we can reasonability conclude that although it is important, it is not the most
signiﬁcant feature driving our results. This is based on the fact that the wage eﬀect in the
simulations seems to have very small impact on female behavior relative to others, say, human
capital accumulations.
Our study was motivated by the fact that the decline in childbearing coincides with higher
wages for females, who are raising fewer children, participating in the labor force in greater
numbers and are working longer hours. Our model is uniquely suited to analyzing whether
shifts in public policy towards child support could aﬀect these trends, and in what ways. As
such we conducted diﬀerent policy simulations which we use to analyze the eﬀects on such trends
and found that the eﬀect diﬀer depending on the social economic group that we are looking at.
This suggests that any such fertility policy must be undertaken with a great degree of care, to
ensure that we are not only subsidizing a group of individuals who would have children in any
event, and hence does not change the population growth rates.
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3312. Appendix 1
In this appendix we deﬁnes a class of conditional choice probability (CCP) estimators, to which
the estimator used in Section 8.3 belongs, and show consistency and asymptotic normality of
these estimators.
12.0.1. A class of CCP estimators.
The estimators (ΘN
3 ,ΓN) deﬁned by equation (??)a n d( ??) are examples of CCP estimators, in
which the individual-speciﬁce ﬀects µN
n ηN
n , time-speciﬁce ﬀects ωN
t λ
N
t and the conditional choice
probabilities pN
knt for k =0 ,..,3 and p
(s,k,N)
0nt for s =1 ,...,ρ enter as incidental parameters. This
estimator falls within a class of CCP estimators that can be described as follows.
Let Dn(Θ,µ n,p n) be a q × 1 vector function such that Θ0 ≡ (Θ30,Γ0) i st h eu n i q u er o o to f
E[Dn(Θ,µ n,p n)]. For each, n ∈ {1,2,...} and Θ ∈ Ξ,l e tµN
n be a kernel or traditional estimator
which converges uniformly to µn,l e tpN
n (µn) be a kernel estimator which converges uniformly








n )) = 0 (12.1)
The proof of proposition 1 below shows that ΘN is asymptotically normal, but is not centered
on zero. While an asymptotically unbiased estimator could be calculated following the procedure
in Hotz and Miller (1993) by forming a linear combination of the estimators which are based on
diﬀerent bandwidths for the incidental parameters, the limited empirical evidence suggests that
the asymptotic bias is unimportant.10
Proposition 1: ΘN converges to Θ0 and
√
N(ΘN − Θ0) is asymptotic normal with mean
−E(vn)/2 and covariance matrix (D0
0)−1S0D0,w h e r evn D0 and S0 are deﬁned by equations
(12.10), (12.17) and (12.18).
Proof.
For ease of notation, we assume that µN
n and pN
n (µN
n ) take the form of nonparametric kernel

















m) − k(zn,µ N
n ))] (12.3)
where k(zm,µ N
m) is mapping that deﬁnes the distance between the observations. The proof
that ΘN converges in probability to Θ0 is standard, relying on the uniform convergence of the
incidental parameters to their true values, so that the approximating sample moments obtained
by substituting the incidental parameter estimates for their respective true values only aﬀect
the resulting structural parameter estimates by an op(1) term.11
10For evidence on the magnitude of this asymptotic bias, see the Monte Carlo simulations in Powell, Stock and
Stoker (1989) and the fertility application in Hotz and Miller (1993).
11See Hotz and Miller(1993) for a consistency proof of a very similar semiparametric estimator.
34To establish the mean, covariance, and bias, we ﬁrst consider anotherestimator denoted by
e ΘN, and show that this has the same asymptotic distributional properties as ΘN. For ease of























The estimator e ΘN satisﬁes the equation
−N−1 XN
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vn = f(xn)[D1n(µn + φn)+D2n(pn + dn)] − D1nµn − D2npn (12.10)
where f(xn) is the density of xn.
Expanding the ﬁrst expression on the right-side of 12.4 using the deﬁnition of the nonpara-
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i =1 ,2. Then appealing to lemma 3.1 of Powell, Stock and Stoker (1989), p.1410












mn]} + op(1) (12.14)
The right-side of 12.14 depends on N. To derive the asymptotic distribution of e ΘN. Lemma

















n=1{vn − E(vn)} + op(1) (12.15)











−E(vn)} + op(1) (12.16)
The Central Limit Theorem implies that the right-side of 12.16 converges in distribution to




N(e ΘN − Θ0) converges to a normal
random variable with mean −
E[vn]




D0 ≡ E[D0n] (12.17)
and
S0 ≡ E[(Dn + vn − E(vn))(Dn + vn − E(vn))0] (12.18)
We complete the proof of this proposition with lemma 2 provided below, which implies that
ΘN and e ΘN have the same asymptotic distribution, that is,
√
N(e ΘN − ΘN) is op(1) Q.E.D.
Lemma 1: N− 1
2 E[vN
mn]








2 + N− 1
2
PN
n=1{vn − E(vn)} + op(1)
Proof.
Consider vN









N (xm − xn)] − D1mµm (12.19)
36Taking the ﬁrst on the right-side of 12.19
E[D1nφmδ
−qJ[δ
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Thus, tn(δ) has a neglible eﬀect because its variance asymptotes to zero and it has a mean of








































n=1{D1nf(xn)(µn + φn) − D1nµn
−E[D1nf(xn)(µn + φn)+D1nµn]+op(1). (12.20)
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N(e ΘN − ΘN) is op(1).
Proof.
Expanding the right-side of 12.1 about the true structural parameters, Θ0 and the true











n − µn)+e D2n(pN
n (µN
n ) − pn(µn))] (12.22)
where ~ indicates that the appropriate partial derivatives are evaluated at points on the line
segment joining (Θ0,µ n,p n) and (ΘN,µ N
n ,p N










n=1[( e D1n − D1n)(µN
n − µn)
+( e D2n − D2n)(pN
n (µN
n ) − pn(µn))] (12.23)














n=1 D0n(e ΘN − ΘN)+op(1)(Θ0 − ΘN)
= {E[D0n]+op(1)}(e ΘN − ΘN)+op(1)(Θ0 − ΘN)
= {E[D0n]+op(1)}(e ΘN − ΘN)+op(1) (12.24)










n − µn) (12.25)
where the right of 12.25 follows from the fact that e D1n converges in probability to D1n uniformly
in n. Similar U-statistic arguments to that used to justify the asymptotic normality of
√
N(e ΘN−




n −µn) converges in distribution to a normal random variable which
is op(1). Therefore, 12.25 is op(N
1




n=1[( e D2n − D2n)(pN
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n ) − pn(µn))
are asymptotically normal. Then using the results obtained for 12.24, 12.25 and 12.26 in 12.22.
We thus establish that
0={E[D0n]+op(1)}
√
N(e ΘN − ΘN)+op(1) (12.27)
Noting that E[D0n] is nonsingular, 12.27 implies that
√
N(e ΘN−ΘN) is op(1) as claimed. Q.E.D.
13. Appendix 2
In this appendix we outline in more detail the methods we used to solve the valuation funcion
used in the policy experiments.To solve the for the valuation function we shall used a hybrid
method which is a combination of the the ﬁnite horizon and inﬁnite horizon contraction .
13.0.2. Optimization
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nt,h nt,...,hnt+1−ρ,b nt,...,bnt+1−M,µ nηn]
and
Pr[Z∗
nt+1 = Z∗ | Z∗





ntk be the optimal action conditional on the current state Z∗
nt. Then we
can recast the problem recursively. To that end, the value function, Vnt(Z∗) is deﬁned for each
















and the transition probabilities
Fntk(Z∗∗ | Z∗










over {0,1,2,3},p a t e n t l yaﬁnite discrete choice problem. Since
Z∗∗ ≡ [z0
nt+1,h nt,...,hnt+1−ρ,b nt,...,bnt+1−M,µ nηn]
40and since Pr[Z∗
nt+1 = Z∗ | Z∗
nt,x nt,h nt,Intk =1 ]≡ Fntk(Z∗∗ | Z∗
nt,x nt,h nt) then the transition
density is deterministic in our model. So let Z∗∗
k the future state variable, then I0
ntk is the
optimal choice that maximizes:
Untk(Z∗)+Vnt+1(Z∗∗
k )
13.0.3. Finite Horizon Problem
The standard solution method is the Bellman’s (1957) perspective of the backward induc-
tion. Suppose the problem has a ﬁnite horizon T, and consider the choices facing an in-
dividual entering the last period with state variables Z∗
nT her valuation function is simple
VT(Z∗
nT)=m a x {UnTk(Z∗
nT)}. Taking expectation of VT(Z∗
nT) one period before when her
















nt,Iknt =1 ) ]
B yt h ee x t r e m ev a l u ea s s u m p t i o n
pk(Z∗











nt,Iknt =1 )=ζ − ln(pk(Z∗
nt))












Having calculated gT−1(Z∗), at the beginning of the period T − 1 the person chooses the
maximum over the diﬀerent options and obtains a valuation function of:
VT−1(Z∗)=m a x {Untk(Z∗
nt)+εknt + βgT−1(Z∗∗)}




By successively solving for the functions gT−1(Z∗) through g1(Z∗), the value function Vt(Z∗) is
derived numerically for all t ∈ {0,...,T}.
4113.0.4. Inﬁnite Horizon
Here we will use the contraction mapping theory to extends the idea of iteration on the value
function to the inﬁnite horizon case. Let H0(Z∗∗) be any real value bounded continuous function




where the integration is over εk , an extreme value Type I random variable. The mapping
C[.] is a contraction mapping, and satisﬁes the ﬁxed point property that a unique H(Z∗∗) solves:
H(Z∗∗)=C[H(Z∗∗)]
In this case H(Z∗∗) is interpreted as the expected value function for the inﬁnite horizon problem:
H(Z∗∗)=E[V (Z∗)].
By a corrollary of the contraction mapping ﬁxed point theorem, we obtain an upper bound
on the sequence of iteration approximating function. In particular for an initial H0(Z∗∗), then
kCs[H0(Z∗∗)] − H(Z∗∗)k ≤ (1 − β)−1 ° °Cs[H0(Z∗∗)] − Cs−1[H0(Z∗∗)]
° °
In our speciﬁc case with the extreme value Type I assumption on the errors, we have:











We can then use a Newton ﬁxed method to numerically solve for the ﬁxed point. The Newton
iteration is of the form:




this gives the following




exp(Uj + βHs)],s > 0
Although convergence is global, an intelligent choice for the intial function H0() reduces the
number of iterations required to achieve convergence. One such choice , is to combine the ﬁnite
horizon problem with the inﬁnite horizon problem and set
H0() = (1 − β)gT−1(Z) (13.1)
which is the discounted life time utility for a household one period before the terminal horizon.
This choice works very well in our application and achieve convergence in 4 to 7 iterations.
4214. Appendix 3
In part B of this appendix, we describe in more detail the construction of our sample and the
construction of the variables used in our study. We used data from the Family-Individual File
, Childbirth and Adoption History File, and the Marriage History File of the Michigan Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The Family- Individual File contains a separate record for
each member of all households included in the survey in a given year. The Childbirth and
Adoption History File contains information collected in 1985-1992 waves of PSID regarding
histories of childbirth and adoption. The ﬁle contains details about childbirth and adoption
events of eligible people living in a PSID family at the time of the interview in any wave from
1985 through 1992. Each set of records for a speciﬁed individual contains all known cumulative
data about the timing and circumstances of his or her childbirth and adoption experience up to
and including 1992, or those waves during that period when the individual was in a responding
family unit. If an individual has never had any children, one record indicates that report. Note
that “eligible” here means individuals of childbearing age in responding families. Similarly, the
1985-1992 Marriage History ﬁle contains retrospective histories of marriages for individuals of
marriage-eligible age living in a PSID family between 1985 and 1992. Each set of records for
a speciﬁed individual contains all known cumulative data about the timing and circumstances
of his or her marriages up to and including 1992, or those waves during that period when the
individual was in a responding family unit.
Our sample selection started from the Childbirth and Adoption history ﬁle, which contains
24,762 individuals. We initially selected women by setting “sex of individual” variable equal to
two. Out of an initial sample of 24,762 individuals included in the Childbirth and Adoption ﬁle,
this initial selection produced a sample of 12,784 female. We then drop any individual who was
in the survey for four years or less, this selection criteria eliminated a further 1,946 individuals
from our sample. We then drop all individuals who were older than 45 in 1967, this eliminated
an additional 1,531 individuals. We then drop all individuals that were less than 14-years-old
in 1991, this eliminated an additional 385 individuals.
The corresponding number of observations for the interviewing year 1968 through 1992 are
given by 5,429,5,608, 5,793,5,970, 6,197, 6,346, 6,510, 6,696, 6,876, 7,094, 7,236, 7,320, 7,393,
7,455, 7,551, 7,634, 7,680, 7,761, 7,712, 7,666, 7,618, 7,574, 7,532, 7,378 and 7,233, respectively.
Since individuals who had become non-respondents as of 1992, either because they and their
families were last to the study or they were mover-out non-respondents in years prior to the 1992
interviewing year, are not in the twenty-ﬁve Family-Individuals Respondents File, the number
of observations increases with the interviewing years.
There were coding errors which occurred for the diﬀerent measures of consumption in the
PSID from which we construct our consumption measure. In particular, our measure of food
consumption expenditures for a given year is obtained by summing the values of annual food
expenditures for meals at home, annual food expenditures for eating out, and the value of food
stamps received for the year. We measured consumption expenditures for year t by taking 0.25
of the value of this variable for the year t − 1 and 0.75 of its value for the year t. The second
step was taken to account for the fact that the survey questions used to elicit information about
household food consumption is asked sometime in the ﬁrst half of the year, while the response
is dated in the previous year.
The variables used in the construction of the measure for total expenditures are also subject
43to the problem of truncation from above in the way they are coded in the 1983 PSID data
tapes. The truncation value for the value of food stamps received for that year is $999.00,
while the relevant value for this variable in the subsequent years and for the value of food
consumed at home and eating out is $9,999.00. Taken by itself, the truncation of diﬀerent
consumption variables resulted in a loss of 467 person-years. We also use variables describing
various demographic characteristics of the women in our sample. The dates of birth of the
women were obtained from the Child Birth and Adoption ﬁle. The age variable resulted in a
loss of 162 individuals.
The race of the individual or the region where they are currently residing were obtained from
the Family portion of the data record. We deﬁned the region variable to be the geographical
region in which the household resided at the time of the annual interview. This variable is not
coded consistently across the years. For 1968 and 1969, the values 1 to 4 denote the regions
Northeast, Northcentral, South and West. For 1970 and 1971, the values 5 and 6 denote the
regions Alaska and Hawaii, and foreign country, respectively. After 1971 a value of 9 indicates
missing data but no person years were lost due to missing data for these variables.
We used the family variable “Race of The Household Head” to measure the race variable
in our study. For the interviewing years 1968-1970, the values 1 to 3 denote White, black, and
Puerto Rican or Mexican, respectively. 7 denotes other (including Oriental and Philippino), and
9 denotes missing data. For 1971 and 1972, the third category is redeﬁned as Spanish-American
or Cuban and between 1973-1984, just Spanish American. After 1984, the variable was coded
in such a way that 1-6 correspond to the categories White, Black, American Indian, Aleutian or
Eskimo, and Asian or Paciﬁc Islander, respectively. A value of 7 denotes the other category, a
value of 9 denotes missing. We used all available information for all the years to assign the race
of the individual for years in the sample when that information was available.
We used a combination of individual and family level variables to construct our measure of
educational attainment. This was because the variable for the individual does not contain data
for the head of the household or wife, this we obtained from the family level ﬁles.
The marital status of a women in our subsample was determined by using the marriage
history ﬁle. The number of individuals in the household and the total number of children within
that household were also determined from the family level variables of the same name. In
1968, a code for missing data (equal to 99) was allowed for the ﬁrst variable, but in the other
years, missing data were assigned. The second variable was truncated above the value of 9 for
the interviewing years 1968 and 1971. After 1975, this variable denotes the actual number of
Children within the family unit.
We constructed some additional variables. The variable showing the value of home-ownership
was constructed by multiplying the value of a household’s home by an indicator variable de-
termining home ownership. A similar procedure was followed to generate value of rent paid
and rental value of free housing for a household. Mortgage payment and Principal of Mortgage
outstanding were obtained from the family variables of the same names. Finally, household in-
come was measured from the PSID variable total family money income, which included taxable
income of head and wife total transfer of head and wife, taxable income of others in the family
units and their total transfer payments.
We used two diﬀerent deﬂators to convert such nominal quantities as average hourly earnings,
household income, and so on to real. First, we deﬁned the (spot) price of food consumption
to be the numeraire good at t in the theoretical section. We accordingly measured real food
44consumption expenditures and real wages as the ratio of the nominal consumption expenditures
and wages and the annual Chain-type price deﬂator for food consumption expenditures published
in table t.12 of the National Income and Products. On the other hand, we deﬂated variables
such as the nominal value of home ownership or nominal family income by the Chain-type price
deﬂator for total personal consumption expenditures.
45Table I: Notations
wnt individual marginal product of labor
xnt consumption of market goods
znt demographic variables
hnt proportion of time worked in period t
as a fraction of the total time available in the period
lnt leisure in period t :balance of time not spent at work or nurturing children
dnt labor force participation dummy
bnt indicator of the birth of a child at period t
γ0 additional lifetime expected utility a household receives for its ﬁrst child
γ0 + γk utility from having a second child when the ﬁrst born is k years old
γ0 + γk + γj utility from having a third child when the ﬁrst two are aged k and j years old
U0nt beneﬁts from oﬀspring to the nth household in period t
U1nt utility costs of the nth female from working in period t
U3nt current utility from consumption by household n in period t
π discounted cost of expenditures of raising a child
ρk nurturing time required by a k year old child
cnt fraction of time the nth household spend nurturing children in the household
η−1
n social weight attached to each individual n
W aggregate endowment or output from the exogenous production process
do
nt optimal labor forceparticipation decision at date t
h∗
nt optimal labor supply
ho
nt optimal labor supply conditional on participation
b0
nt optimal birth decision
λt shadow value of consumption
µn time-invariant individual-speciﬁce ﬀect of marginal product
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4(AGEnt × EDUnt) B32
0.0161
(3.1e − 03)
† Standard Errors in parenthesis
49Table IV: Consumption Equation
ln(xnt)=1 /(1 − α)[z0




4FAM nt (1 − α)−1B21
3.19e − 02
(3.0e − 04)
4YKID nt (1 − α)−1B22
−3.33e − 02
(1.6e − 03)








4NCnt (1 − α)−1B25
−3.7e − 03
(3.3e − 03)
4SOnt (1 − α)−1B26
−1.19e − 02
(3.2e − 03)
† Standard Errors in parenthesis












p0nt 0.4369 0.4044 0.4377 0.4052
p1nt 0.5191 0.4036 0.5182 0.4036
p2nt 0.0153 0.0721 0.0153 0.0721
p3nt 0.0288 0.1128 0.0288 0.1128
p0(H
(1)
0nt)0 .7344 0.1658 0.7338 0.1675
p0(H
(2)
0nt)0 .2460 0.1254 0.2477 0.1278
p0(H
(3)
0nt)0 .1745 0.0909 0.1744 0.0927
p0(H
(4)
0nt)0 .1154 0.0662 0.1162 0.0674
p0(H
(5)
0nt)0 .1400 0.0634 0.1405 0.0637
p0(H
(1)
1nt)0 .1581 0.1274 0.1592 0.1296
p0(H
(2)
1nt)0 .4007 0.1956 0.4012 0.1973
p0(H
(3)
1nt)0 .5978 0.2455 0.5975 0.2464
p0(H
(4)
1nt)0 .6656 0.2370 0.6656 0.2362
p0(H
(5)
1nt)0 .6863 0.1699 0.6840 0.1685
p0(H
(1)
2nt)0 .7199 0.1993 0.7231 0.1915
p0(H
(2)
2nt)0 .5626 0.2175 0.5632 0.2116
p0(H
(3)
2nt)0 .4804 0.2261 0.4913 0.2236
p0(H
(4)
2nt)0 .4970 0.1961 0.4935 0.1952
p0(H
(5)
2nt)0 .4146 0.1488 0.4238 0.1464
p0(H
(1)
3nt)0 .2777 0.2275 0.2824 0.2310
p0(H
(2)
3nt)0 .3103 0.2431 0.3127 0.2425
p0(H
(3)
3nt)0 .3300 0.2600 0.3261 0.2553
p0(H
(4)
3nt)0 .2730 0.2102 0.2756 0.2075
p0(H
(5)
3nt)0 .2181 0.0635 0.2179 0.0684
†Time-averaged individual eﬀects
‡Nonparametrically estimated individual eﬀects













1nt)/(∂hnt) −0.0714 0.0474 −0.0716 0.0474
∂p0(H
(2)
1nt)/(∂hnt) −0.1405 0.0637 −0.01399 0.0642
∂p0(H
(3)
1nt)/(∂hnt) −0.1370 0.0963 −0.1365 0.0947
∂p0(H
(4)
1nt)/(∂hnt) −0.1318 0.1070 −0.1312 0.1067
∂p0(H
(1)
3nt)/(∂hnt) −0.0939 0.0613 −0.0924 0.0608
∂p0(H
(2)
3nt)/(∂hnt) −0.1089 0.0693 −0.1073 0.0673
∂p0(H
(3)
3nt)/(∂hnt) −0.1126 0.0766 −0.1109 0.0728
∂p0(H
(4)
3nt)/(∂hnt) −0.1471 0.0812 −0.1487 0.0794
†Time-averaged individual eﬀects
‡Nonparametrically estimated individual eﬀects
52Table VI: Fixed Utility of Labour Force Participation
u10(znt)=dntB0z0
nt






































† Standard Errors in parenthesis.













































† Standard Errors in parenthesis.







































































† Standard Errors in parenthesis.










πnt (znt)=π0 + z0
ntπ1


























































† Standard Errors in parenthesis.
56TABLE IX
Completed Fertility Simulation Outcome
Marital Education Actual Estimation Expenses Daycare Wages Retraining
Black
M < 2.12 2.45 2.63 2.41 2.57 2.69
HS 1.93 2.03 2.60 2.82 .19 3.00
> 1.35 1.68 1.71 2.31 .66 2.50
U < 2.15 2.35 2.56 2.58 2.41 2.57
HS 1.82 1.97 2.04 2.11 .98 2.05
> 1.23 1.17 1.26 1.85 1.37 2.24
Hispandic
M < 2.08 2.19 2.23 2.31 2.25 2.02
HS 1.83 1.79 1.89 2.03 1.87 2.35
> 1.55 1.46 1.50 1.87 1.49 2.03
U < 2.00 2.15 2.23 2.26 2.23 2.31
HS 1.78 1.87 1.96 2.12 1.89 2.38
> 1.46 1.56 1.67 2.00 1.72 2.30
White
M < 1.78 2.04 2.12 2.16 2.09 2.07
HS 1.34 1.52 1.63 2.30 1.67 2.45
> 1.12 1.23 1.32 1.97 1.24 2.03
U < 1.47 1.56 1.54 1.78 1.58 1.87
HS 1.25 1.31 1.56 1.90 1.67 2.08
> 1.11 1.24 1.39 1.78 1.48 2.03
57TABLE X
Simulation outcomes for Annual Labour Force Participation Rate
Marital Education Actual Estimation Expenses Daycare Wages Retraining
Black
M < 0.570 0.452 0.436 0.421 0.476 0.423
HS 0.673 0.772 0.722 0.732 0.724 1.723
> 0.781 0.729 0.745 .742 0.732 0.732
U < 0.678 0.616 0.606 0.627 0.601 0.591
HS 0.723 0.763 0.751 0.749 0.761 0.763
> 0.897 0.912 0.913 0.916 0.915 0.921
Hispandic
M < 0.612 0.634 0.632 0.625 0.623 0.618
HS 0.722 0.745 0.739 0.738 0.737 0.735
> 0.823 0.856 0.842 0.845 0.835 0.812
U < 0.732 0.742 0.692 0.693 0.695 0.683
HS 0.752 0.765 0.745 0.746 0.748 0.746
> 0.824 0.878 0.867 0.857 0.856 0.872
White
M < 0.678 0.693 0.687 0.598 0.662 0.597
HS 0.897 0.876 0.874 0.873 0.878 0.871
> 0.912 0.927 0.921 0.928 0.926 0.923
U < 0.753 0.734 0.727 0.714 0.701 0.692
HS 0.857 0.876 0.767 0.798 0.845 0.855
> 0.866 0.857 0.867 0.849 0.867 0.856
58Figure I: Estimated Change in Aggregate Wage


















































59Figure II-a: Traditional Estimates of Fixed Eﬀects of Marginal Products
Figure II-b: Nonparametric Estimates of Fixed Eﬀects of Marginal Products
60Figure III: Aggregate Prices
61Figure IV -a: Traditional Fixed Eﬀects Estimates of Social Weights
Figure IV-b: Nonparametric Fixed Eﬀects Estimates of Social Weights
62Figure V-a: Traditional Shadow Prices of Consumption
Figure V-b: Nonparametric Shadow Prices of Consumption
63